CARE: Lightweight Attack Resilient Secure Boot Architecturewith Onboard\n Recovery for RISC-V based SOC
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Abstract
Recent technological advancements have proliferated the use of small embedded\ndevices for collecting, processing, and transferring the security-critical\ninformation. The Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled remote access and control\nof these network-connected devices. Consequently, an attacker can exploit\nsecurity vulnerabilities and compromise these devices. In this context, the\nsecure boot becomes a useful security mechanism to verify the integrity and\nauthenticity of the software state of the devices. However, the current secure\nboot schemes focus on detecting the presence of potential malware on the device\nbut not on disinfecting and restoring the soft-ware to a benign state. This\nmanuscript presents CARE- the first secure boot framework that provides\ndetection, resilience, and onboard recovery mechanism for the com-promised\ndevices. The framework uses a prototype hybrid CARE: Code Authentication and\nResilience Engine to verify the software state and restore it to a benign\nstate. It uses Physical Memory Protection (PMP) and other security enchaining\ntechniques of RISC-V processor to pro-vide resilience from modern attacks. The\nstate-of-the-art comparison and performance analysis results indicate that the\nproposed secure boot framework provides a promising resilience and recovery\nmechanism with very little 8 % performance and resource overhead\n
Publication details
- DOI
- 10.48550/arxiv.2101.06300
- OpenAlex
- W4287388821
- Document type
- preprint
- Language
- EN
- Source
- arXiv (Cornell University)
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