conference-paper وصول مفتوح

Design and Implementation of a Comprehensive Insider Threat Ontology

  • Procedia Computer Science
  • Elsevier BV
Research footprint

At a glance

الاستشهادات
10
المراجع
20
Comments
0
Paper overview

Abstract

We describe the development and envisioned use case applications of a comprehensive insider threat ontology—“Sociotechnical and Organizational Factors for Insider Threat” (SOFIT)—that comprises more than 300 indicators of technical, behavioral, and organizational factors. Requirements, design, and engineering development for the Web Ontology Language (OWL) implementation of the SOFIT knowledge base are reviewed; additional relationships among constructs are defined that extend the representation beyond a simple taxonomic hierarchy and that enable inferences for qualitative and quantitative threat assessment. We show how queries may be constructed to support these inferences and threat assessments. Several major application concepts are reviewed to show how the ontology may be used by the insider threat research and operational communities. To this end, the SOFIT knowledge base may be shared with stakeholders to advance research and practice for proactive insider threat mitigation.

Record transparency

Publication details

DOI
10.1016/j.procs.2019.05.090
OpenAlex
W2956577829
Document type
conference-paper
Language
EN
Source
Procedia Computer Science
Last metadata update
المجتمع

Comments

تسجيل الدخول للانضمام إلى النقاش.

  1. لا توجد تعليقات بعد. ابدأ النقاش.