DP→HE: A Temporal Architecture for Practical Homomorphic Encryption via Bidirectional Taint Analysis
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Abstract
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables computation on encrypted data but imposes 100-10,000× performance overhead, rendering it impractical for most applications. Hardware Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) offer an alternative but require specialized silicon and remain vulnerable to microarchitectural side-channel attacks. This paper introduces DP→HE (Deterministic Parsing to Homomorphic Encryption), a novel architectural framework that achieves 10-100× speedup over traditional FHE while maintaining equivalent cryptographic security. The key innovation is a mandatory temporal constraint: static program analysis must complete before any encryption operations commence. Combined with bidirectional taint analysis—intersecting forward propagation from secret sources with backward propagation from secret sinks—the architecture identifies a mathematically minimal encryption surface, typically comprising only 1-10% of program operations. This represents a paradigm shift from optimizing homomorphic operations to minimizing what requires encryption. The software-only implementation runs on commodity processors without hardware modifications, providing post-quantum security via lattice-based cryptography. U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63/941,743, filed December 16, 2025. Commercial implementation requires licensing. Contact: ilyesmazari@hotmail.com
Publication details
- DOI
- 10.5281/zenodo.17955545
- OpenAlex
- W7115721114
- Document type
- preprint
- Language
- EN
- Source
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
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