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Quantum keystroke logging

  • arXiv (Cornell University)
  • Cornell University
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Abstract

Superdense coding has long been regarded as a secure quantum communication protocol. It is natural to assume that employing logical quantum states with error-correcting capability would not compromise this security. However, in the context of GKP-based quantum communication, we propose a vulnerability that we term quantum keystroke logging. Specifically, consider a large organization that prepares and transmits logical Bell states without ever assembling the full encoded Bell state. Even under this restriction, the organization can still extract the input information without detection, thereby realizing a form of quantum keystroke logging.

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Publication details

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2509.13659
OpenAlex
W4414691580
Document type
preprint
Language
EN
Source
arXiv (Cornell University)
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