preprint Open access

Prompt Injection 2.0: Hybrid AI Threats

  • arXiv (Cornell University)
  • Cornell University
Research footprint

At a glance

Citations
0
References
0
Comments
0
Paper overview

Abstract

Prompt injection attacks, where malicious input is designed to manipulate AI systems into ignoring their original instructions and following unauthorized commands instead, were first discovered by Preamble, Inc. in May 2022 and responsibly disclosed to OpenAI. Over the last three years, these attacks have continued to pose a critical security threat to LLM-integrated systems. The emergence of agentic AI systems, where LLMs autonomously perform multistep tasks through tools and coordination with other agents, has fundamentally transformed the threat landscape. Modern prompt injection attacks can now combine with traditional cybersecurity exploits to create hybrid threats that systematically evade traditional security controls. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of Prompt Injection 2.0, examining how prompt injections integrate with Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), and other web security vulnerabilities to bypass traditional security measures. We build upon Preamble's foundational research and mitigation technologies, evaluating them against contemporary threats, including AI worms, multi-agent infections, and hybrid cyber-AI attacks. Our analysis incorporates recent benchmarks that demonstrate how traditional web application firewalls, XSS filters, and CSRF tokens fail against AI-enhanced attacks. We also present architectural solutions that combine prompt isolation, runtime security, and privilege separation with novel threat detection capabilities.

Record transparency

Publication details

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2507.13169
OpenAlex
W4415310439
Document type
preprint
Language
EN
Source
arXiv (Cornell University)
Last metadata update
Community

Comments

Log in to join the discussion.

  1. No comments yet. Start the discussion.