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Should we hate hate speech regulation? The argument from viewpoint discrimination

  • The Philosophical Quarterly
  • Oxford University Press
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Abstract

Abstract According to philosophers like James Weinstein, our democratic values give us a compelling reason to tolerate hate speech. In fact, they argue that even if hate speech causes significant harms, our democratic values nonetheless sometimes call for a hands-off approach. In particular, they evoke the democratic value of citizens being free to criticize and voice dissent towards the laws that bind them. This paper seeks to establish two key points. First, that upon closer examination, the kind of arguments that Weinstein presents against hate speech regulation is less than convincing. Secondly, that by building on Weinstein's discussion of the concept of viewpoint discrimination, we can construct a more convincing objection to hate speech regulation. That said, this more convincing objection falls short of calling for the abolition of all hate speech regulation, instead highlighting the need for transparency and consistency in the way governments regulate harmful speech.

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Publication details

DOI
10.1093/pq/pqae086
OpenAlex
W4401558012
Document type
article
Language
EN
Source
The Philosophical Quarterly
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