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DeMarking: A Defense for Network Flow Watermarking in Real-Time

  • arXiv (Cornell University)
  • Cornell University
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Abstract

The network flow watermarking technique associates the two communicating parties by actively modifying certain characteristics of the stream generated by the sender so that it covertly carries some special marking information. Some curious users communicating with the hidden server as a Tor client may attempt de-anonymization attacks to uncover the real identity of the hidden server by using this technique. This compromises the privacy of the anonymized communication system. Therefore, we propose a defense scheme against flow watermarking. The scheme is based on deep neural networks and utilizes generative adversarial networks to convert the original Inter-Packet Delays (IPD) into new IPDs generated by the model. We also adopt the concept of adversarial attacks to ensure that the detector will produce an incorrect classification when detecting these new IPDs. This approach ensures that these IPDs are considered "clean", effectively covering the potential watermarks. This scheme is effective against time-based flow watermarking techniques.

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Publication details

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2402.03760
OpenAlex
W4391670509
Document type
preprint
Language
EN
Source
arXiv (Cornell University)
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