preprint Open access

A Comparative Study of Classical and Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms in the Era of Quantum Computing

  • arXiv (Cornell University)
  • Cornell University
Research footprint

At a glance

Citations
0
References
0
Comments
0
Paper overview

Abstract

The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the foundational cryptographic algorithms that secure modern digital communications. Protocols such as HTTPS, digital certificates, and public key infrastructures (PKIs) heavily rely on cryptographic primitives like RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks -- most notably Shor's algorithm. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative analysis between classical cryptographic algorithms currently in widespread use and emerging post-quantum cryptographic schemes designed to withstand quantum adversaries. We review the cryptographic mechanisms underpinning modern internet security, outline the mathematical foundations of quantum attacks, and evaluate the security, performance, and implementation feasibility of quantum-resistant alternatives such as Kyber, Dilithium, and Falcon. Additionally, we assess the hybrid approaches currently being explored by institutions and tech companies to enable a smooth transition to post-quantum cryptography. By providing an in-depth comparison, this study aims to guide researchers, developers, and policymakers in understanding the critical implications of quantum computing on cryptographic infrastructures and the necessary steps for securing communications in the quantum era.

Record transparency

Publication details

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2508.00832
OpenAlex
W4417160800
Document type
preprint
Language
EN
Source
arXiv (Cornell University)
Last metadata update
Community

Comments

Log in to join the discussion.

  1. No comments yet. Start the discussion.