Receipt-Freeness By Flexible Usage Of Mix Network

Coercion-resistence is an important security property of private network applications like e-voting, a common. Traditionally, its implementation depends on special and complicated cryptographic technologies and assumptions, which cannot be conveniently supported by the mainstream network-security solutions. So, coercion-resistence is often regarded as a special security property and not available in many network application schemes. In this paper, a novel design only employing commonly available and standard security tools is proposed to achieve receipt-freeness, the most important coercion-resistence property, in a standard mix-net-based e-voting scheme. The new scheme allows each voter to change his own vote when it is shuffled in the network (before the voting deadline and the counting phase) but cannot interfere with the shuffle of other votes. Needing none of the unorthodox techniques in the existing solutions, it does not depend on any additional or special assumption/condition in either computation or communication. The technology can be applied to other secure online services run on a mix network as well. So, by flexibly using existing mix net technologies it can implement receipt-freeness as a common security property in a standard architecture and help to keep high efficiency in applications like e-voting.