Yuval Elovici

USBee: Air-gap covert-channel via electromagnetic emission from USB

2016

In recent years researchers have demonstrated how attackers could use USB connectors implanted with RF transmitters to exfiltrate data from secure, and even air-gapped, computers (e.g., COTTONMOUTH in the leaked NSA ANT catalog). Such methods …

The Translucent Patch: A Physical and Universal Attack on Object Detectors

2021

Physical adversarial attacks against object detectors have seen increasing success in recent years. However, these attacks require direct access to the object of interest in order to apply a physical patch. Furthermore, to hide multiple …

Sequence Squeezing: A Defense Method Against Adversarial Examples for API Call-Based RNN Variants

2021

Adversarial examples are known to mislead deep learning models so that the models will classify them incorrectly, even in domains where such models have achieved state-of-the-art performance. Until recently, research on both adversarial attack and …

Toward Scalable and Unified Example-Based Explanation and Outlier Detection

2021 · IEEE Transactions on Image Processing

When neural networks are employed for high-stakes decision-making, it is desirable that they provide explanations for their prediction in order for us to understand the features that have contributed to the decision. At the same …

PowerHammer: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers through Power\n Lines

2018 · arXiv (Cornell University)

In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of\nPowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate\ndata from air-gapped computers. In this case, a malicious code running on a\ncompromised computer can …