Extremely Lightweight and Fundamental VLSI Design Method against Power Analysis Attacks

As the IoT society develops, cryptographic security becomes even more important.However, side channel security remains a vulnerability without a definitive solution.We focus on power analysis attacks that estimate internal information from processor power consumption which is one of side channels and propose lightweight countermeasures to reduce the area and delay overhead compared with conventional countermeasures.FPU, FPD and W-FF, proposed countermeasures, can be used in conjunction with conventional countermeasures since it is a design method that does not interfere with conventional countermeasures.The evaluation in this paper shows that W-FF, the proposed design method with the best performance in tamper resistance, is close to the conventional countermeasure in terms of security performance and requires only a 5% increase in area overhead, while the conventional countermeasure requires more than double the area.