Coup-Proofing in the Shadow of External Security Threats

Despite the importance of external security threats for understanding coups, scholars remain divided on how these threats ultimately shape the likelihood of coups. One perspective argues that external threats stabilize civil-military relations and thereby reduce coup risk, while another contends that they increase coup risk. This study proposes that an authoritarian regime's coup-proofing strategy is the key factor mediating the impact of external threats on coup propensity. We argue that under conditions of external security threats, excessive coup-proofing increases military grievances and provides incentives for the military to stage a coup. Using a new measure of coup-proofing, we show that excessive coup-proofing not only exacerbates grievances within the armed forces, but also undermines commitment between the military and the regime. Our findings shed new light on how domestic coup-proofing measures interact with external security threats to shape political stability, thereby contributing to ongoing debates on civil-military relations and authoritarian survival.